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SECOND MORTGAGES  AND HOUSEHOLD  SAVING 
ABSTRACT 
Second mortgages accounted for  10.8%  of the  stock of out- 
standing mortgage debt  at the  end  of 1987,  up  from 3.6%  at the 
beginning of the  198Os.  This  paper investigates the determinants 
of second mortgage borrowing and  the characteristics of  second 
mortgage borrowers.  We  first calculate the outstanding stock of 
home equity that  remains to be borrowed against on tax-preferred 
terms,  recognizing the limits on interest deductions in the  1986 
Tax Reform Act and the  1987  Omnibus Budget  Reconciliation Act. 
Despite these limits,  we  estimate that more than  two  trillion 
dollars of housing equity remains to be borrowed against by 
current homeowners.  We  then present cross-sectional evidence 
suggesting that  households who obtain second mortgages after 
purchasing a home ace  less  wealthy than other households with 
similar characteristics.  Each dollar  of second mortgage borrowing 
is associated with a  seventy-five cent  reduction in household net 
worth.  While these  results cannot be given a causal interpreta- 
tion,  they are consistent with the view that increased access to 
second mortgages has  reduced personal saving. 
Joyce M. Manchester  James M. Poterba 
Department  of  Economics  Department  of  Economics 
Dartmouth  College  M.I.T. 
Hanover,  NH  03755  Cambridge,  MA  02139 Second mortgages are  one  of the most rapidly growing 
financial products of the  1980s.  While the  real  value of first 
mortgage debt climbed at an annual rate  of 4.3% during the  1980- 
1987  period,  junior mortgage debt  grew at 23.3%  per year. 
Second mortgages accounted for 10.8%  of the stock of mortgage 
debt outstanding at the end of 1987,  up from 3.6%  just seven 
years ago.  While some  second mortgages are  incurred when a home 
is purchased, the most rapid expansion has  involved post- 
acquisition second mortgages. 
The  growth of second mortgages reflects increased utiliza- 
tion of traditional mortgage instruments  as well as financial 
innovation.  Home  equity credit lines  have  become increasingly 
popular since their introduction in the early 1980s.  They 
accounted for  approximately  one  third of outstanding second 
mortgage debt  at the end of 1987,  and  their  recent growth 
- - 
doubling  in 1987  alone -- far  exceeds that  of other mortgages. 
Restrictions on the tax-deductibility  of non-mortgage interest 
payments contained in the  1986  Tax Reform Act are  likely to spur 
continued growth of second mortgage borrowing. 
One  of the central issues associated with the increased 
availability and utilization of second mortgages concerns the 
impact of these  instruments on private saving.  Summers and 
Carroll (1987)  argue  that  the growth i  mortgage debt  during the 
last  eight years  has  spurred consumerspending  and depressed 
private saving.  While  advertising  for  home  equity lines  may 
have encouraged households to accelerate spending plans,  the 
adverse effect of second mortgage borrowing on private saving is 2 
not  obvious.  Households may have  used second mortgages to 
finance investments in other assets,  or substituted second 
mortgages for  other  types  of borrowing.  This  view is supported 
by a  recent Survey Research Center study  showing that  more than 
half of those with home  equity lines report using them  at  least 
in part  to repay other  debts. 
This  paper investigates the recent rise  in second mortgage 
borrowing and examines its impact on private saving.  The first 
section places the  recent  increase in second mortgage activity 
in context, documenting broad trends in residential borrowing 
during the last three  decades and providing specific evidence on 
the recent growth in home  equity credit lines.  Section two 
examines the magnitude of potential  home equity borrowing, 
recognizing that  second mortgages have  not diffused completely 
through the population.  We explicitly account for recent 
limitations on the amount of tax-deductible  second mortgage 
interest and show that  even assuming households refrain from 
non-deductible  borrowing, over  two trillion dollars of home 
equity remains  to be borrowed against. 
The next two sections present evidence on the  link 
between second-mortgage  borrowing and wealth accumulation. 
Section three explains why aggregate evidence on the  coincidence 
between declines in private saving and increased home  equity 
borrowing is weak,  and describes the  data  set drawn from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)  that  underlies 
our  results.  Section four presents cross-sectional tests  of the 3 
impact of second mortgages on household weslth sccumulstion. 
The results show thst  on sversge,  s household with one  sddition- 
sl dollsr of second mortgsge borrowing hss  seventy-five cents 
less  net worth thsn  s household without s  second mortgsge. 
There is little  evidence thst  households with second mortgages 
hold higher levels  of finsncisl  sssets,  sithough we  find a wesk 
positive sssocistion between second mortgsge borrowing snd 
noncorporste business equity.  Section five  considers the 
fsctors thst  sffect decisions to obtsin second mortgages, 
focusing on how  the  stock  of sccrued residentisl cspitsl gsins 
slters the probsbility of remortgsging.  Our conclusion discus- 
ses directions for future work on how the mortgsge msrket 
affects residential capital  accumulation. 
1.  Trends in Residential Financing. 1950-1988 
The  rise  in second aortgage borrowing during the  l980a  has 
helped propel  the debt-to-value ratio  on owner-occupied  housing 
to its highest level  since  World War II.  Table 1 shows  the  time 
series for  this  ratio,  which rises  from  the early l950a  through 
the mid-l970a.  In part because owner-occupied  house prices rose 
by 35 percent in real  terms  during the  1970s1,  the debt-to-value 
ratio declined from  42%  in 1970  to 36%  in 1980.  The combination 
of natural turnover, with its tendency to raise loan-to-value 
ratios, and second mortgage borrowing has raised this  ratio 
1Poterba (1984)  and Mankiw and Weil (1988)  present alterna- 
tive  explanations for house price movements during the  1970a. Table  1:  First  and Second  Mortgage  Debt,  1950-1987 
Total Mortae  Debt  Second  Mortaes  Loan-to-Value 
Year  (% of owner-Occupied  Housing)  (% of All Mortgages)  Ratio (%) 
1950  25.5%*  3.1% 
1960  36.8%  2.0%  72.9% 
1970  42.1%  1.5%  71.5% 
1980  35.8%  3.2%  72.9% 
1982  6.7%  72.9% 
1984  9.6%  77.0% 
1985  75.8% 
1986  43.8%  74.1% 
1987  45.2%  75.2% 
Source:  Column  1:  Federal Reserve  Board  (June 1988),  1950 value  is for 1952:1. 
Column  2: Values  for 1980 and  before  are drawn  from  decennial  Census of 
Housing.  Post-1982  values  are drawn  from  NSMA  Equity  (Center Square, PA:Na- 
tional Second  Mortgage Association,  March  1988). Column  3:  FHLBB  data  on new 
conventional  mortgages.  1960 value refers  to January  1963,  1970  to July,  all 
others  are annual  averages. 
38.0% 
40.2% 
42.5%  10.3% 
10.3% 
10.8% 4 
during the  1980s. 
The  rise  in the debt-to-value ratio coincides with rapid 
growth of  second mortgage borrowing.  While loan-to-value ratios 
for new mortgages have not changed substantially during the 
1980s  (see  Table 1),  the debt-to-value ratio was  three  per- 
centage points higher than  in 1970.  If second mortgage borrow- 
ing as  a share of the housing capital stock had remained 
constant at  its  1980  level,  the debt-to-value ratio would have 
been only 41.5%  in 1987,  slightly below the  level  of 1970.2  In 
part,  the rapid growth of second mortgages may reflect changes 
in nominal interest rates  during the  1980s.  Since  lending 
institutions usually determine lending capacity by relating 
nominal interest payments to household income,  falling interest 
rates  enabled  households to qualify for larger mortgages.  Some 
households may have exercised their  new borrowing power by 
obtaining a  second mortgage rather  than by refinancing their 
first  mortgage. 
The  rise  of  second mortgage borrowing is  significant in 
comparison to the  decline  in household saving during the  1980s. 
Since  1980,  the annual flow of new  second mortgage borrowing has 
averaged just below one percent of disposable income.  The 
private saving rate  in the  1980s  has averaged 2.2 percent below 
2Our analysis focuses on second mortgage borrowing since 
this  is one  way  for households to borrow against accumulated 
housing equity.  Refinancing  the  first mortgage on a residence 
could also  achieve this  end.  Quigley (1987)  discusses the 
determinants of refinancing behavior and references recent 
studies 5 
its level in the  1970s.  The present paper attempts to provide 
some  insight on whether such  a link  between saving and second 
mortgages is appropriate. 
The characteristics of  actual  and potential second mortgag- 
ors  raise  doubts about the  role  of second mortgages in reducing 
saving.  Table 2 presents evidence on the fraction of homeowners 
in different age groups who have second mortgages, based on 
tabulations from  SIPP.  The table  distinguishes between second 
mortgages that  were obtained when the  house  was purchased, and 
those obtained after home  purchase.  The incidence of second 
mortgages peaks for households with heads between 35 and  44 
years of age:  more  than  15%  of households in this  group  report 
second mortgages.  The  rate  is only slightly lower  (14.3%)  for 
households headed by 45-54 year  olds.  These two  age  groups 
account for  more  than two-thirds of the outstanding second 
mortgages. The lowest rates  of  second  mortgage borrowing are  for 
the very young (<25)  and the elderly (>64),  two groups that have 
low marginal propensities to save. 
The  reasons second  mortgagors incurred their  debts  also 
raise  questions about  how these  mortgages affect saving. 
Results from  the 1980 Census of Housing on why second mortgagors 
obtained these  debts  are  informative.  Of those who  responded, 
51%  of respondents cited the  need  to make  home improvements as 
motivating their  borrowing decision, 18%  cited other investments 
either in real  estate or other  assets,  4.6%  cited education or 
medical expenses,  and  26% cited other  reasons.  More than half Table  2:  Age Distribution  of Second  Mortgage  Borrowing  and Home Equity 
Fraction  With  Share of Outstanding  Second 
2nd Mortgages  Mortgages  (by Value) 
Total  Post-Acquisition  Total  Post-Acquisition 
< 25  13.6%  6.8%  1.4%  0.9% 
25-34  13.2%  7.0%  17.1%  11.7% 
35-44  15.4%  13.0%  38.0%  41.7% 
45-54  14.3%  12.0%  29.6%  31.6% 
55-64  6.1%  4.5%  12.2%  12.0% 
> 64  1.4%  1.3%  1.7%  2.1% 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  all homeowners  in Survey  of Income and 
Program  Participation  Wave  VII  (8943 households).  Tabulations  use sampling 
weights  to reflect population  statistics. 6 
of the households with second mortgages reported investment, 
rather than consumption, factors  as motivating their decision to 
borrow.  The national accounts define some  expenditures on 
renovations, as well as medical and educational expenses, as 
consumption.  Part  of  these  expenditures should be viewed as 
investments in human capital or consumer durables, and could 
therefore arguably be excluded from consumption.3 
A 1987  survey by the Survey Research Center directed at 
second mortgagors with home equity lines  (HELs)  yielded similar 
findings.  For these households,  53% reported that the first use 
of their HEL was  to pay  off other debt.  One  quarter indicated 
they obtained their home  equity  loan principally to finance a 
home  improvement, although another 19% of the respondents indi- 
cated some  subsequent use of the home equity loan  to finance 
renovations.  In addition, 12% of the respondents indicated the 
loan  was used to finance a new car purchase, while only 8% used 
4 
the HEL  for medical or education expenses.  Measured consump- 
tion is clearly higher for  these  two  groups,  although the  link 
with home equity loans  is unclear.  Many car buyers may have 
used HELs,  which offer lower  interest  rates  than  other types  of 
consumer debt,  in place  of other forms  of automotive debt.  The 
results do not reveal how  many  households initiated HELs for 
non-consumption reasons,  but subsequently used these instruments 
3These 1980 survey results  precede the recent growth in 
home equity borrowing, which may  have  changed the rationale for, 
and uses of,  second mortgage debt. 
4More detail may be  found  in Canner, Fergus, and Luckett (1988 to finance consumption outlays.  The impact of  second mortgage 
borrowing on household consumption is therefore an empirical 
question. 
2.  How Much Home  Equity Is Still  Locked  Up? 
The  previous section noted the rapid rise  in second 
mortgage borrowing during the  1980s,  but provided no  evidence on 
the magnitude of potential future  borrowing.  Since the  Tax 
Reform Act of 1986  (TRA)  raised the attractiveness of home 
equity borrowing in comparison to other  types  of consumer debt, 
an  increasing fraction of households are likely to  incur  second 
mortgages.  While  it is straightforward to calculate the 
household sector's net  equity in owner-occupied  real  estate, 
recent tax changes restrict the  amount  of mortgage interest that 
households may deduct from  their  taxable  income.  Estimating the 
amount of home equity that  could be borrowed against at favora- 
ble  after-tax interest rates  therefore requires information  on 
the fraction of households that  would be affected by the  legal 
caps on  interest deductibility, and  the amount of housing equity 
they  hold.  In this  section we describe the  limits  on tax- 
deductible borrowing, and then use  the  SIFF  data base to 
estimate the amount of home  equity that  remains to be  levered in 
a  tax-deductible form. 
2.1  Limitations on Tax-Deductible  Home Morteage Interest 
The TRA phased out deductions for  all consumer interest 8 
except that  on debt  secured  by first or second homes.  Interest 
on original purchase home  loans  of  less  than $1 million remains 
fully deductible under the TRA,  and this  upper limit  binds for 
relatively few households.  Mortgages obtained after purchase 
are subject to tighter restrictions.  While the  TRA  instituted 
"tracing rules"  that  made  interest deductibility contingent on 
the purpose for which debt  was incurred, these complex rules 
were  superceded by provisions in the  198]  Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act.  A taxpayer can deduct unlimited interest on 
post-acquisition borrowing provided the  debt  is used to finance 
additions or alterations  to the residence.  For other-purpose 
debt incurred after October 13,  1987,  however, a taxpayer may 
deduct interest on mortgage debt  of D  min(V, D  .  .  + 
cap  original 
$100K).  V is the current market value of the taxpayer's home, 
and  fl  .  .  is  the outstanding principal on the original  or  i  ginal 
purchase loan.5  Early in  a  taxpayer's tenure as a homeowner, 
the home's current market value is likely to be  the binding 
constraint on the amount of debt.  At some  stage,  however, if 
debt  repayment and home appreciation raise  accumulated home 
equity above $100,000,  the second constraint binds. 
A homeowner can never deduct interest on non-renovation 
mortgages in excess  of the original purchase mortgage principal 
plus $100,000, regardless of what  mortgage instruments are 
combined in reaching this  total.  For  a household incurring a 
5The  OBRA restrictions apply to combined debt  on first and 
second  homes,  although for simplicity our  discussion focuses 
only on first homes. 9 
new second mortgage while retaining an original-purchase first 
mortgage  these  rules  limit the amount of tax-deductible second 
mortgage borrowing for purposes other than additions and altera- 
tions to D  where 
cap2 
(1)  D  — min(V 
-  D  $100K). 
cap2  original 
For  a household that  previously refinanced its original purchase 
mortgage and therefore has current first-mortgage  principal of 
D  D  is given  by:  refin  cap2 
(2)  D  = min(V  -  D  $10011  -  D  + D 
cap2  original  refin  original 
Since  after-tax  borrowing costs rise  discontinuously at  D 
cap 
most households will probably avoid  borrowing more  than the 
limit except in circumstances of financial distress.  Our next 
section calculates the amount of accumulated home equity that 
could be  levered at  tax-favored  rates. 
2.2  Estimates of Available Home Equity 
To  estimate the amount of equity that  might be borrowed 
against for  purposes other  than home  renovations, we make three 
assumptions:  (1)  households cannot borrow more  than  90%  of the 
value of their  home,  (ii)  households borrow up  to,  but not more 
than,  the amount of  debt  that  they may incur while still 
completely deducting interest payments from their  taxes,  and 
(iii)  half of the existing second  mortgage debt  was used to 
finance renovations and therefore  would not  be  counted against 10 
the $100,000 limit  on post-acquisition indebtedness.  For most 
households, these assumptions lead to straightforward calcula- 
tions  of the amount of available tax-deductible  borrowing.  For 
households who refinanced their  first mortgage, we do not have 
information on the remaining principal on their  acquisition 
loan.  We  impute  this  using aggregate data on fixed-rate 
mortgage terms in the  year  when the home was purchased.6 
Table  3 presents our  tabulations  on the  stock of available 
home equity.  The  average property value for homeowners in our 
sample was  $79,500 (1988  dollars),  with equity of $58,000.  The 
total  home equity represented  by our  sample  is therefore $3.03 
trillion.7  The average amount  of  tax-deductible  equity is 
$45,800;  this  translates to  a potential stock of $2.53 trillion 
in unused borrowing.  If the $100,000 limit  on tax-deductible 
second mortgage debt  had been in place  in 1985,  only  10.5%  of 
homeowners would have  been affected.8  Many elderly households 
6We assume that  households that  refinanced initially 
borrowed eighty percent of  the purchase price of their home 
using a 30 year fixed rate  mortgage at the FHLBB's average 
mortgage interest rate. 
7The  sampling weights for households in our sample trans- 
late  into  55.2 million households,  somewhat smaller than  the 
Census Bureau's estimate of 55.5  million homeowning households 
in 1985.  The  1985  home  equity in our  sample,  weighted to 
correspond to the population, is $2.75  trillion.  This is higher 
than the Federal Reserve Board's estimate of net housing equity 
($1.96  trillion)  for  1985.  The  difference between SIPP  and Flow 
of Funds estimates has been noted before,  for example in U.S. 
Bureau of  the  Census  (1986)  ,  although  there  is as yet no 
convincing explanation  of the disparity. 
8Our  calculations  on  the effect of the $100,000 limit 
examine 1985  nominal debt  limits with a real value of  $100,000 
in 1988  dollars. Table  3:  Estimates  of Untapped  Home Equity,  1988 dollars 
Homeowners  with  Homeowners  Without  All 
Current Mortgages  Current Mortgages  Homeowners 
Property  Value  (thousands)  $87.1  $67.5  $79.5 
Home Equity  (thousands)  $52.0  $67.5  $58.0 
Equity  Available  for 
orrowing  (D/V < .90)  $43.4  $60.8  $50.1 
$  lOOK Maximum  for Tax- 
Deductible  borrowing: 
Available  Equity  for 
Borrowing  (DIV < .90)  $40.7  $54.0  $45.8 
Fraction  Constrained 
y  Limitation  (in 1985)  9.8%  11.7%  10.5% 
$SOK Maximum  for Tax- 
Deductible  borrowing: 
Available  Equity  for 
borrowing (D  < .90)  $30.8  $40.2  $34.4 
Fraction  Constrained 
y  Limitation  (in 1985)  34.9%  47.3%  39.7% 
Number  of Homeowners  (million)  33.9  21.3  55.2 
Source:  Authors'  tabulations  using  SIPP Wave  VII Topical  Module  Data. 11 
appear reluctant to borrow against their home equity,  although 
the  reasons for such behavior are not well  understood  (see Venti. 
and Wise  (1988)).  Assuming that  households headed by someone 
over age  65 would not borrow,  the stock of available equity is 
$1.86 trillion. 
We also  calculated the  pool  of tax-deductible  borrowing 
that would be associated with limits  below $100,000 on  the 
amount of second mortgage debt.  A limit of $50,000 would reduce 
the  stock of available equity to $1.90  trillion.  Even with such 
modest limits on borrowing, the diffuse distribution of home 
equity makes  the amount of potential borrowing quite  large. 
Our  final  calculation concerns the amount of consumer debt 
that could be replaced by home equity borrowing.  We  tabulated 
the fraction of reported consumer debt that  was held by homeown- 
ers  and  that  could be replaced by mortgage debt.  For example, 
if a homeowner reported $120,000 of consumer debt,  we assumed 
that only  D  would be borrowed as deductible housing debt. 
cap2 
[f a non-homeowner reported $120,000 of consumer debt,  we 
assumed that  none would be  replaced with housing debt.  Our 
tabulations show that  52.2%  of unsecured consumer debt  (which 
totalled $254 billion in the  1985  SIP?  population) could be 
replaced by tax-deductible  housing debt.  For  a broader credit 
aggregate consisting of unsecured consumer debt plus  vehicle 
debt ($403 billion), 55.9%  could have been  replaced with 12 
borrowing backed by home equity.9  This  suggests that the  long- 
run effects of the  1986  and  1987  tax reforms may be  a  sig- 
nificant reallocation of  consumer  borrowing from traditional 
consumer debt  to mortgage debt. 
3.  Second MortEages and Wealth Accumulation: Data arid Methods 
The  extent  to which increased access  to and utilization of 
second mortgages has  depressed  private saving is difficult to 
gauge from  aggregate time-series  evidence.  The  data  suggest a 
rough  correspondence between the  rise  in second mortgages during 
the  early  1980s  and  the decline in private saving.  The limited 
information  on second mortgage borrowing  before 1980,  however, 
largely precludes formal statistical  analysis of the link 
between changes in mortgage borrowing and consumption. 
This  suggests the need for alternative data  sources for 
addressing the impact of second mortgages on household saving. 
An ideal  data  set  for  this  project would include longitudinal 
information on household income  and  consumption,  first and 
second mortgage debt  and other types  of consumer borrowing, and 
other factors such  as wealth that  might affect spending decis- 
ions.  Panel  data  might permit some  controls for  the obvious 
problem of population heterogeneity that  clouds the  interpreta- 
tion  of any cross-sectional results  on saving behavior. 
9Our calculations assume that household behavior and asset 
prices will not  adjust in response to the new rules  on interest 
deductibility.  Manchester (1988)  discusses a variety of  such 
general equilibrium effects. 13 
Moreover, it would need evidence on access to second mortgage 
debt,  since  it is difficult to interpret the  simple correlation 
between borrowing and consumption without some  exogenous 
variation in borrowing opportunities. 
While some  data  sets  (i.e.  the  PSID)  include the data 
outlined above,  they  are ruled out for this  project because they 
10 
were conducted before the recent growth of  second mortgages. 
The data set that comes  closest to satisfying our requirements 
is the  Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)  ,  the 
Census Bureau's new longitudinal  data base  on household economic 
status.  Each  SIPP  panel consists  of nine  sets  of interviews at 
four-month intervals,  with information  on income,  employment, 
and transfer receipt collected in each interview.  Supplemental 
information on asset  holdings, housing finance,  pension wealth, 
and other  topics  is queried sporadically.  The  data we  analyze 
were  collected in 1985,  after  the rapid growth of second 
mortgages at the beginning of the  1980s  but prior to the  recent 
growth of home equity lines. 
The  crucial drawback of SIPP  is the lack of data on 
household consumption expenditures.  This  limitation severely 
restricts our analysis.  Instead of comparing consumption 
outlays by households with and without second mortgages, we 
follow an indirect procedure that  has been used in previous 
10Skinner (1988)  examines the  links  between housing capital 
gains and consumption outlays using data from the  1983  Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics.  His sample therefore precedes much 
of the  recent  growth in second mortgages  which may have helped 
finance consumption from  housing gains. 14 
studies of how pensions and Social Security benefits affect 
household saving (see  King  and Dicks-Mireaux (1982)  and the 
studies cited there).  We study the correlat  ton between second 
mortgage borrowing and household net worth  rather than consump- 
tion.  If individuals  are homogeneous except  with respect to 
mortgage decisions,  and  if consumption is unaffected by mortgage 
borrowing  then we  should find  evidence  that  households with 
second mortgages also  have other assets  -- stocks  and bonds, 
more  valuable homes,  or businesses -- that  offset these debts. 
If second mortgages provide a way of financing  college or 
cruises,  however, households with such mortgages will exhibit 
lower  net worth than  those  without.  We begin by comparing the 
net worth of households with and without second mortgages, and 
then study how net worth changes when households obtain such 
mortgages. 
Before examining the  data,  we must urge caution in inter- 
prettng our  results.  When households are heterogeneous and 
variation in second mortgage borrowhig is correlated with 
unobserved household characteristics,  it  is  difficult to use 
correlations to draw  inferences about  how policy changes  such 
as  restrictions on second mortgage tax-deductibility,  would 
affect consumption.  A simple example illustrates this.  Imagine 
two  types  of households: lucky  and unlucky ones.  Lucky ones 
experience unexpected capital gains  on  their  portfolio assets 
such  as stocks  or human capital,  and can finance  high level  of 
consumption without resort to borrowing.  Such  households would 15 
have  high net worth and relatively little  second mortgage debt. 
Unlucky households, in contrast, may experience unemployment or 
high medical costs and therefore  need to borrow to finance 
consumption.  These households will exhibit both high rates of 
second mortgage borrowing and relatively low net worth.  The 
negative correlation between second mortgage debt  and household 
net worth in this  case results from the association between 
second mortgage borrowing and other household attributes. 
Nevertheless, such correlations may suggest stylized facts  for 
structural models to explain. 
3.1  The  51FF  Data Set 
The  SIP?  began with 26000  randomly-selected noninstitution- 
al housing units in the United States,  just  over  80%  of which 
(20,900)  were actually occupied and eligible for interview. 
Attrition reduced that  number  to 16,259 by Wave VII,  which 
inquired about  housing and mortgage status.  Our analysis 
focuses on the  8943  homeowners in this  data set.  The  sample 
yields a homeownership rate  of 59.0%,  slightly below the 
national value of 63.9%  for  1985. 
SIP? is  the best available  data set  for investigating the 
incidence and effect of second mortgage financing, but  it 
suffers from several limitations.  First,  while the survey 
follows the sharp increase in traditional second mortgage 
borrowing at  the beginning of the  1980s,  it predates the recent 
growth in home-equity credit  lines.  Interviews for Wave IV 16 
(Wave  VII)  were conducted  between September and December, 1984 
(1985).  Federal Reserve Board estimates suggest that  home 
equity lines  were  four  times  as large  at the end of 1987  as at 
the end cf 1985,  so our  data  may  fail  to reflect the behavior of 
recent home equity borrowers. 
The  second limitation of SIPP results from  steps  to protect 
respondent anonymity.  The public use  file  reports total 
mortgage debt top-coded at $100,000 and  does  not separate first 
and  second mortgages.  The market value of  the respondent's home 
is top-coded at $200,000 and monthly income  is also capped, 
although the upper limit  varies across  households.11  We  filed a 
Freedom of Information Act request and obtained supplemental 
information on total  mortgage debt  topcoded at $200,000, as well 
as the  share  of  that  debt  accounted for by junior mortgages. 
Only 33 of the  8943 homeowners in our  sample  (.4%)  were affected 
by the upper limit  on mortgage debt.  A somewhat higher fraction 
--  4.8%  --  were  affected  by the  topcoding on the  total  market 
value  of their home. 
Broad characteristics of our  sample  are presented in Table 
4.  We  report sample means  of several variables for  all homeown- 
ers,  for  those  with one  or more  mortgages, and  for  those  who 
have second mortgages.  Homeowners with multiple mortgages are 
younger, have  higher annual incomes,  and  have  more valuable 
homes than homeowners with just  first  mortgages or with no 
An  individual with irregular income  will  be  allowed to 
report a higher income  level  in  a given month than a salaried 
employee, since  it would be  easier  to identify the  latter. Table  4:  Sample  Means  for SIPP Wave VII Homeowners,  Using Sampling Weights 
All Homeowners  All Homeowners 
Variable  All Homeowners  with Mortgages  with 2nd Mortgages 
Property 
Value  $73,384  $81,180  $92,560 
Debt-to- 
Value  Ratio  0.29  0.48  0.58 
Mortgage  Debt  $22,683  $36,935  $51,931 
Household 
Income  (Annual)  $33,491  $38,755  $41,097 
Net Worth  $108,416  $93,133  $88,982 
51.3  43.7  43.2 
Household  Size  2.8  3.2  3.4 
Sample  Size  8943  5402  904 
Source:  Authors'  tabulations based  on 1984 SIPP, Wave  VII, homeowners  sample. 17 
outstanding mortgage debt.12  The  net worth of households with 
second mortgages averages approximately $22,000 below  that  of 
all  other homeowners, and roughly $4,000  below that  of homeown- 
ers with one mortgage (the  "with  one mortgage" category can be 
calculated from the  data  in Table 4).  Net worth is defined 
inclusive of investments in individual retirement plans, such as 
Keoghs,  but exclusive of  the pension assets that employees may 
be entitled to.  The measure also  excludes Social Security 
wealth,  which may be the principal asset for  some  retired or 
nearly-retired households. 
Households with second mortgages have  more total mortgage 
debt  than  other households --  $32,500  more  than  the  average for 
homeowners without second mortgages, and $15,000 more than the 
average for homeowners with only  first  mortgages.  This 
evidence indicates that  households with second mortgages have 
lower net  worth,  but  not by the  full  amount of their  second 
mortgages, relative to households without such  debts.  Comparing 
means is suspect,  however, because there  are no controls for 
household characteristics; this  is why the  next  section presents 
regression analysis. 
3.2 Second Mortgages and Household Wealth: Cross  Sectional Tests 
Our  specification for household net worth follows that  of 
120ne  disturbing feature of the  SIPP  sample  is its higher 
incidence of second mortgage holders than in the population at 
large.  The  1985 National Housing Survey reported 56.15 million 
owner-occupied housing units,  of which 3.3 million (5.9%)  had 
outstanding junior mortgages.  In our  sample,  the fraction with 
second mortgages is 9.8%. 18 
King and Dicka-Mireaux (1982,  1983)  in their atudiea of how 
penaion wealth affecta houaehold accumulation.  We begin by 
aaauming that a houaehold'a net worth ia an age-apecific 
multiple of ita  income,  and define  indicator variablea for aix 
age  categories baaed on the  age  of houaehold head:  <25,  25-34, 
35-44,  45-54,  55-64,  and  65+.  We  then  relate net worth to each 
of theae variables interacted  with meaaured four-month income 
recorded in SIPP Wave VII.  Our  reduced-form equation for  net 
worth also  includes a household's marital status,  number of 
children,  and highest year  of  schooling,  in part  because these 
variables may affact a household's rate  of accumulation and in 
part  because they  are choices that  may  reflect time  preference 
or other factors  that  influence saving.  We also add  indicator 
variables for  six broad classes of occupation and four  indicator 
variables for  region of residence,  again proxying for  income  or 
cost-of-living factors that may impinge on  a household's wealth 
but may not  be captured in our simple specification,  as well as 
an indicator  variable for whether household mortgage debt or 
housing equity was  top-coded. 
We  construct three  variables to measure a household's 
mortgage debt position.  The first is the  outstanding 
tion indebtedness on the  current property, the  second is the 
liability on refinanced first  mortgages, and  the third is post- 
acquisition second mortgage borrowing.  Refinancing may occur 
for either of two  reasons:  interest rates  may have declined 
since the  first  mortgage was  obtained,  or the household's 19 
consumption or inve:-tent demands may dictate an increase in 
home  leverage.  The latter possibility suggests that  refinancing 
a first mortgage is an alternative to second mortgage borrowing, 
implying that  the  net worth of households with refinanced first 
mortgages may be  lower than that  of households with acquisition 
first mortgages. 
Zero  coefficients on the various mortgage debt measures in 
a  regression explaining net worth would indicate that  households 
with greater mortgage debt  aLso hold greater assets.  If  alA, of 
the cross-sectional variation in mortgage behavior arises 
because different households had decided to buy houses of 
different sizes,  consequently 'orrowing different amounts and 
possibly resorting to second mortgages to raise  their loan-to- 
value ratio,  net  home  equity might be relatively constant and 
therefore mortgage debt  might not help  predict net  worth.  If 
households that  take  out  second mortgages after  their  homes 
appreciate reinvest the proceeds in housing, financial assets, 
or businesses, we would again expect  no relationship between the 
13  second mortgage or refinanced-mortgage  variable and  net  worth. 
If households use  second mortgages and refinanced first 
mortgages to finance consumption outlays,  then  these  debt 
variables should be negatively correlated  with net  worth.  As we 
noted above,  however, such  a negative correlation could also 
130ur  data show  that  76.8%  of all second mortgage debt  was 
incurred subsequent to the home purchase,  arguing against the 
view that  the division of total  mortgage debt  between first and 
second mortgages is simply an artifact of the  way  acquisition 
debt  was  structured. 20 
emerge if households differ in their  returns on past investments 
or in their unexpected consumption  needs.  A zero coefficient is 
also  possible in the presence of such heterogeneity.  if 
households with large  capital gains  on their homes respond to 
these windfalls by obtaining second mortgages and consuming the 
gains,  then net housing equity would vary relatively little 
across  households and it would display little if any correlation 
with second mortgage borrowing.  Nevertheless, second mortgages 
might be used to finance consumption.  If households adhere to a 
pre-determined age-wealth profile,  then  unanticipated capital 
gains  are consumed when they  occur.  Those with and without 
second mortgages will therefore show  similar net worth posi- 
tions,  but  those with second mortgages will have experienced 
larger housing capital gains  and used second mortgages to 
liquidate them. 
The importance of housing capital gains  in  the second 
mortgage decision  suggests  controlling  for  these  gains  in the 
net worth equation.  SIPP  includes  a question on the purchase 
price of  the current home,  and  in principle this  could be used 
to calculate housing capital gains.  However, many  reported 
purchase prices seemed erroneous,  especially for  homes  purchased 
more than  thirty years prior to the  survey.  Several households 
reported purchase prices equal to their  home's current market 
value,  even though it was purchased long  ago,  perhaps because 
they  misunderstood the questionnaire.  Moreover, the  change in 
value need not  correspond to  the household's capital gain.  A 21 
homeowner who  spends  significant amounts on renovations will 
report s  current market value well  above the purchase price,  but 
may not have  a  capital gain. 
We  avoided these difficulties by developing an alternative 
measure of accrued gains.  Since  1963,  the Census Bureau has 
compiled an index of the purchase price for constant-quality 
single-family houses in four  different regions.  Using the 
household's reported date  of purchase in conjunction with the 
regional identifier we constructed a variable measuring house 
price appreciationJ4  This  variable also  has  disadvantages: it 
ignores land values and  it neglects location-specific price 
moves that are  not  reflected in regional aggregates.  It is 
nevertheless the housing capital gain  variable used in the 
subsequent regressions. 
The  regression model we estimate is 
(3)  NETWORTH —  +  E$.*AGE.*INCOME.  +  -y  *MORTACQ +  -y  *REFIN + 




+  €. 
The  equation  also  includes dummy variables for  different Census 
regions and  for occupational categories,  as well as  an indicator 
variable for households whose net worth was  top-coded at 
14We  extrapolated the Census Bureau series for pre-1963 
years using the National Income  and Product Accounts residential 
structures deflator, assuming that  all regions experienced the 
same  price movements. 22 
$200,000.  In the  twelve  cases  (of 904  with junior mortgages) 
when a household had both second  and  third mortgages, the 
aggregate stock of junior mortgages was  included in MORT2.  We 
estimate this  equation by  ordinary least squares, and  also 
explore instrumental  variable estimates in an effort to control 
for  the  endogeneity of MORT2. 
4.  Estimation Results: Cross Sectional Evidence 
We estimate equation (3)  on three different data  samples: 
all  of the homeowners on 51FF,  all homeowners except those with 
incomes in the  top decile of the  income  distribution, and  all 
homeowners except those with  net worth in excess  of one million 
dollars.  Our sample choices are partly designed to mitigate the 
effect of mortgage debt  topcoding, a problem that  is more severe 
for higher income  households.  In addition, these  sampling rules 
may shed light on behavioral differences in the population. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 5.  Most of the 
estimated coefficients seem  plausible: net worth is a higher 
multiple of current income for  older  households than for younger 
ones,  households in which the  head  of household is married are 
wealthier, but  otherwise larger households have somewhat smaller 
net  worth,  and higher education  yields higher net worth. 
A consistent pattern emerges  from  the mortgage debt 
coefficients.  Acquisition indebtedness  has a small positive 
effect on net  worth.  The effect is statistically insignificant 
for  the  full  sample,  although the hypothesis of no effect can be Table  5:  Estimates  of Net Worth  as a Function  of Mortgage  Borrowing 
Variable  All Homeowners 
All Homeowners  Except 
Top Income Decile 
All Homeowners  Except 
NETWORTH>$1M 
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Notes:  All estimates  by  OLS from  SIPP  Wave  VII.  See text for further details. 23 
rejected in the smaller samples.  For refinanced mortgage debt, 
there  is  a negative and statistically significant association 
with net  worth.  Each  dollar of refinanced  mortgage is as- 
sociated with between a  twenty  and  thirty cent reduction in net 
worth, with a stronger effect when high-income and high-wealth 
households are included. 
The coefficients on the post-acquisition second mortgage 
debt variable are  even  larger than those  on refinanced debts. 
Each dollar of  second mortgage borrowing is associated with 
between a sixty and  a seventy-five cent  reduction in net  worth. 
The  samples excluding millionaires and  the high income  house- 
holds yield similar results.  Although the  standard errors  on 
these estimates are  sizable,  the null  hypothesis that  second 
mortgages do not  affect net worth can be  rejected at standard 
confidence levels.  The hypothesis that  each dollar of second 
mortgage borrowing translates into  a one dollar reduction in 
household net worth is also  rejected. 
The house price  appreciation  variable affects net worth in 
a positive and significant  manner.  The coefficients suggest 
that  an additional dollar of real  housing capital gains  is 
associated with roughly one  dollar  and thirty cents of addition- 
al net worthj5  Since  these  equations include the stock of 
15  .  - 
Skinner  (1988)  finds relatively small effects of housing 
capital gains  on consumption,  consistent  with our evidence that 
for non-second mortgage households, most housing capital gains 
augment net  wealth.  Our  equations  are concerned solely with 
capital gains  on the current residence, however, so if a 
household with a large  gain consumes it in part by moving to a 
new house,  our analysis will  not reflect this. 24 
second mortgage debt,  the capital gain variable indicates the 
net worth effect of  a capital gain  with no post-acquisition 
second mortgage.  Our  finding  of a more  than one-for-one effect 
from  housing gains could reflect our  omission of capital gains 
on land:  land  prices may have appreciated  by more than house 
prices,  generating a  Timultiplierli  effect for  the house price in- 
crease. 
The principle objection to the ordinary least  squares 
results in Table  S  is that  mortgage borrowing and  net worth are 
simultaneously determined.  This  makes it impossible to inter- 
pret the resulting correlations  as evidence of what  would happen 
if,  for example, mortgage borrowing were restricted by law. 
Identifying the structural coefficient that  measures the net 
worth effect of an exogenous shift  in second mortgage borrowing 
is difficult, since it requires us to find instrumental  vari- 
ables that  affect a household's demand for second mortgages but 
not  its net worth.  We  are  not convinced that valid instruments 
exist,  although one possibility for  future  work might involve 
interstate variation in banking practices. 
We  explored the robustness of our  OLS  findings by treating 
second mortgage debt as endogenous,  performing instrumental 
variable estimation with imperfect instruments.  The  instrumen- 
tal variable results ranged widely,  depending on  the instruments 
we used.  When the household's outstanding medical and tuition 
bills were used as instruments,  on the grounds that  they  might 
reflect shocks to liquidity that would induce borrowing, the 25 
estimated coefficient on MORT2 was  - .96  with  a very large 
standard error.  Adding indicator  variables for  the  presence of 
such debt,  or for Census region,  to the  first  stage equation 
caused the coefficient on MORT2  to change signs and often 
yielded large positive coefficients.  The lack of  robustness in 
these equations reflects the  low correlation between the 
instruments and the mortgage debt variables. 
Much of the policy concern surrounding the low rate  of 
private saving is motivated by concern that  corporations are 
foregoing investment opportunities because of an  inadequate 
supply of loanable funds.  On this  view,  not  only the level of 
household net worth but  its allocation  between different assets 
may be  important.  If second mortgage borrowing finances 
residential additions and alterations,  the ultimate effects on 
the corporate capital stock  are different than  if households use 
their  second mortgage proceeds to invest in corporate stock. 
Fortunately,  SIPP  records  some  detail on portfolio composition 
that  enables  us  to address this issuej6 
Table 6 reports estimates  of disaggregated asset holding 
l6  may yield somewhat  misleading information on the 
disaggregated structure of household portfolios.  Net worth and 
income are reported on  a household basis,  while disaggregated 
assets  and liabilities are reported on an  individual basis.  For 
assets held jointly, such as  a husband-wife checking account, 
the survey attributes the  asset's  full  value to kQ.sj.  owners. 
Our analysis focuses on detailed balance sheet information for 
only the head of household, since  the other alternative 
aggregating all assets held by household members, will overstate 
actual asset holdings.  Our procedure therefore omits assets 
held individually  by household members other than the household 
head,  although the consequent bias  in our results is unclear. Table  6:  Portfolio  Composition  and Post-Acquisition  Second  Mortgage  Borrowing 
Acquisition  Refinanced  Post-Acquis- 
Mortgage  Mortgage  ition Second Accrued  Home 
Asset Category  Amount  Amount  Mortgage  Capital Gain 
Housing  Equity  .002  -  280  -  536  0.964 
(.012)  (.026)  (.033)  (0.010) 
Other  Real  Estate  .058  .161 
- .017  0.108 
(.021)  (.044)  (.056)  (0.017) 
Interest-Bearing 
- .020  - .078  - . 85  0.073 
Assets  (.013)  (.028)  (.035)  (0.010) 
Net Vehicle  Equity  .001  - .002  - .024  0.019 
(.002)  (.005)  (.007)  (0.002) 
Business  Equity  .053  .029  .173  0.009 
(.018)  (.039)  (.049)  (0.015) 
Corporate  Equity 
- .039  - .066 
- .117  0.025 
& Mutual  Funds  (.035)  (.074)  (.094)  (0.028) 
IRA5  .003  - .026  .035  0.014 
(.004)  (.008)  (.011)  (0.003) 
Unsecured  Debt  .027  .051  .015  -0.007 
(.008)  (.018)  (.022)  (0.007) 
Other  Total Assets  .005  .006  - .059  0.137 
(.047)  (.098)  (.125)  (0.037) 
et  Worth 
Each set of coefficients  is drawn from  an equation  relating  a  given  asset  stock 
to the exp'anatory  variab'es  in  equation  (3).  Standard  errors are shown  in 
parentheses.  All estimates  are by OLS from SIPP Wave VII using  the sample of 
all homeowners  corresponding  to  Table  7 column  1. 26 
equations in which the  right  hand side variables parallel those 
in equation (3), but the dependent variable is only  one  com- 
ponent of net worth.  We parallel the analysis of Table S  for 
the  sample  of all homeowners.  The results suggest that  second 
mortgages have relatively small  effects on net holdings of most 
assets.  There is little evidence that  second mortgages are used 
to finance investments in traded assets such as corporate stock 
or bonds; households with second mortgages hold less,  not  more, 
of these  assets.  We  find no evidence that  households with 
larger second mortgages have  less  consumer debt  outstanding.17 
The  two asset categories that  are significantly positively 
correlated with outstanding second mortgage debt are equity in 
sole  proprietorships and holdings of IRAs.  Conditional on s 
household having one additional dollar of second mortgage debt, 
we predict that it will have approximately seventeen cents  of 
additional equity in  a business.  It will have three and one 
half  cents  of additional IRAs.  These results suggest a  direc- 
tion for  future  work,  exploring the  links  between residential 
borrowing and small business financing.  The results in Table 6 
also  show that household with post-acquisition second mortgages 
have  approximately fifty cents  less net home equity per dollar 
of second mortgage borrowing.  This  statistic reflects an 
average across  households with different  behavioral patterns. 
17Since our sample period is prior to the growth of home 
equity loans,  which facilitated  debt  consolidation, and prior to 
the  Tax Reform Act  of 1986,  which provided incentives for such 
consolidation, findings are  not conclusive. 27 
For  some,  the  full  amount  of the second mortgage may be ploughed 
back into  home improvements.  This  would imply  no change in net 
housing equity provided marginal "q"  on these  projects equals 
unity, while net housing equity would decline if marginal "q"  is 
less  than  one.  Alternatively, some households may obtain second 
mortgages and finance current consumption,  causing a decline in 
net home  equity by the  full  amount of their second mortgage. 
Our regression results merely indicate  the association 
between second mortgage debt  and other  financial characteristics 
of the homeowning population.  They do not permit us to draw 
conclusions about  what would happen if second mortgages were 
made less  accessible,  for example by tightening restrictions on 
tax deductibility.  Such restrictions  might instead lead  to 
other forms  of borrowing or asset  sales  to finance  spending 
needs.  Further work developing a structural  model for borrowing 
and saving decisions is needed to resolve  these  questions. 
5.  Second Mortgage Borrowing Decisions 
SIP?  respondents were asked about their housing assets  and 
mortgage liabilities twice  during the  survey.  The  first set  of 
questions were part of the Topical Module for  Wave  IV,  ad- 
ministered during the  last  four  months  of 1984.  One year later, 
a similar (but not  identical) set  of questions was  included as 
part of Wave VII.  Our cross-sectional tests  focus  on the Wave 
VII  data,  the  most  recent data available on the  incidence of 
second mortgages.  It is also  possible to investigate the 28 
characteristics of households acquiring second mortgages by 
studying differences in second mortgage liabilities between 
Waves IV and  VII.  We use  these  data to study the determinants 
of new second mortgage borrowing and to test  the importance of 
accrued housing capital  gains  in motivating household decisions 
to obtain second mortgages. 
The  average second mortgage principal for households 
obtaining new,  non-acquisition second mortgages between these 
two  surveys was $18,952 and  the average decline in net worth was 
$6855,  or  36%  of the borrowed amount.18  This  is roughly half 
our  cross-sectional estimate that  each dollar of second mortgage 
debt reduces net worth by  approximately seventy-five cents.  The 
smaller longitudinal  estimate might reflect the  time  lag between 
mortgage borrowing and  spending:  asset balances may rise for a 
period after the  debt  is incurred while the household makes 
purchases.  Households obtaining  new loans  also experience an 
average reduction of $2071  in unsecured consumer debt,  or 
approximately eleven percent of  the new second mortgage 
19  amount. 
18We  identified 381 households with second mortgages in 
Wave  VII  but without second mortgages in Wave IV.  This  appears 
to be an unusually large increase in second  mortgage borrowing, 
since  only 904 households in Wave VII have second mortgages.  We 
have not yet  identified the  source  of this  faster-than-national- 
average growth in second mortgage debt  in our  sample. 
19We  also  estimated regression models for  the change in net 
worth as  a function of changes in second mortgages outstanding 
and other factors.  The point estimates were inconsistent with 
those  from  the cross section:  an additional dollar of  second 
mortgage borrowing was associated with  a five  cent  increase in 
net  worth,  although the large standard error for  this  coeffi- 29 
Our principal interest in the longitudinal data is in 
exploring what determines second mortgage borrowing.  In the 
last section we discussed the possbility that  second mortgages 
are  used to reduce net housing equity  when unanticipated capital 
gains raise net worth above  the desired age-net worth trajec- 
tory.  This  view implies that  households with large accrued 
capital gains  should  be  more  likely to incur  second mortgages 
than households without such gains,  conditional on the level of 
housing equity before second mortgage borrowing.  If a household 
has  accumulated a significant stock  of housing equity by paying 
down its first mortgage according to  a lifecycle plan,  it will 
not have  an elevated remortgaging probability,  while  if the 
equity results from  capital gains,  it will. 
We  test  this proposition by estimating a probit model for 
the  decision to obtain a non-acquisition second mortgage between 
SIPP  Waves IV and VII,  The explanatory variables include the 
net value of home  equity before second  mortgages, other net 
worth, household income,  our measure of house appreciation, as 
well as the  demographic,  occupation,  and regional indicator 
variables included in Table 520 
Table  7  reports estimates of the probit coefficients for 
dent (24.3  cents)  makes it impossible to reject the hypothesis 
that  net  worth declines by  thirty to forty percent of the  second 
mortgage amount. 
201n  earlier equations we  included the level of househol,d 
income times  age dummy variables, to reflect different levels of 
accumulated net worth at different  points in the lifecycle.  In 
these  equations we include the  age  dummy  variables without interactio Table  7:  Probit  Estimates  of  Borrowing  Probabilities 
All Homeowner  Sample  All Homeowner  < 65 Sample 
Variable  Coefficient  Derivative  Coefficient  Derivative 
Net Housing  -0.521 
- .0005  0.485  .0006 
Equity  (1.066)  (1.086) 
Accrued  Housing  5.750  .0058  4.617  .0058 
Capital  Gain  (1.423)  (1.468) 
Non-Housing  -2.273  - .0023  -2.994 
-  M038 
Net  Worth  (0.401)  (0.499) 
Household  39.137  .0396  50.902  .0643 
Income/Month  (15.377)  (16.209) 
Sample  Size  7434 (364 new mortgages)  5379  (348 new mortgages) 
Notes:  All equations  include additional  demographic,  regional,  and household 
variables  as described  in  text.  Derivatives  denote  effect  of a ten thousand 
dollar  increase  in  the dependent variable  on  the probability  of obtaining  a 
second mortgage,  evaluated  at sample mean  probability.  Standard  errors  are 
reported  in  parentheses. 30 
the  four variables of principal interest.21  The  equation is 
estimated for  two  data  samples:  one including all homeowners 
without second mortgages in Wave  LV,  and  the other all such 
homeowners who were  less  than 65 years of  age  in Wave IV.  The 
results provide striking confirmation for  the view that  second 
mortgages are used by households with significant accrued 
capital gains.  The household's net  home  equity has a statisti- 
cally insignificant and  substantively trivial effect on second 
mortgage probabilities (a ten  thousand dollar increase in 
housing equity lowers  the chance of obtaining a second mortgage 
during 1985  by below one  tenth  of one percent, when the average 
risk of acquiring a mortgage was  6.5%).  In contrast, the 
accrued stock of capital gains has  an  important  and  statistical- 
ly significant effect  on borrowing probabilities.  A ten 
thousand dollar housing capital gain  raises the one-year 
borrowing probability  by  .007.  The  other  variables have 
plausible signs 
-  households  with more  non-housing wealth are 
less likely to obtain new second mortgages, with one thousand 
dollars of net worth predicted to reduce the chance of obtaining 
a second mortgage by half as much as one thousand dollars of 
capital gain raises  it.  Households with higher incomes are more 
likely to obtain second mortgages; this  may in part  reflect 
their ability to qualify for  such borrowing. 
21  - 
Complete  results  for  the probit estimation are available 
from the authors or are included in the  data  appendix deposited 
at  ICPSR. 31 
6.  Conclusion 
Our  findings suggest a significant negative correlation 
between a household's stock of secondrnortgage debt  and its net 
worth.  On average,  each additional dollar of second mortgage 
borrowing is associated with a seventy-five cent  reduction in 
household net worth.  These results are consistent with the view 
that  the  rise  in second mortgage borrowing during the  L980s has 
financed higher levels  of personal consumption and depressed 
private saving.  Our results do not provide definitive evidence 
in support of this  view,  however, because it is difficult to 
isolate exogenous  variation in mortgage borrowing.  Conclusions 
on the potential effects of tighter limits on second mortgage 
borrowing or of restrictions on interest tax deductibility must 
await a structural model of the borrowing decision. 
Our  analysis of the second mortgage market has  considered 
only one channel by which these  instruments affect capital 
formation.  A central question for  future  work is how the rise 
of HELs and second mortgages  has  altered incentives for  residen- 
tial  capital formation.  The  U.S.  tax  code  encourages investment 
in owner-occupied  housing rather than nonresidential capital; 
the  relative illiquidity  of housing investments partly counter- 
acts  these tax  incentives.  The evolution of new institutions 
that  facilitate  borrowing against  housing equity may ultimately 
encourage resource allocation toward the housing sector. 
Increased housing liquidity  may also affect housing market 
dynamics.  The increased availability of second mortgage borrow- 32 
ing may reduce household mobility, both because the  incidence of 
discress sales may fall  and because households will find it 
easier co borrow and expand cheir  exiscing homes instead of 
moving.  This may  affect the  set  of homes which "trickle down" 
from one set of homeowners co another, with unclear welfare 
effects.  Recenc tax rules chac  treac acquisition debt more 
favorably than subsequent borrowing may have an opposite effecc, 
however, and raise  turnover.  These issues  warrant investiga- 
cion in future work. 33 
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